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LEGISLATIVE HIGHLIGHTS
"Legislative Highlight" marks the appearance of a new section in
the University of Florida Law Review.

It will appear biennially

following the termination of each legislative session. The statutes
noted are selected from those felt to be of general interest to the
Florida Bar. Each enactment chosen is summarized and commented
upon, with references made to pertinent cases or periodicals. Since
lack of space prevents a more comprehensive treatment, the criticism
and research are not exhaustive; these statutes may be subjected to a
more thorough analysis in subsequent issues.
For a "birds-eye" summary of the more important general laws
passed by the 1951 Legislature,see the "Tallahassee Letter" found in
Florida Statutes Annotated Supplement (July, 1951).
ELECTION OF DOWER
By amendment Section 731.35 of Florida Statutes 1949, relating to
a widow's election to take dower, has been expanded to allow an
election by three classes of persons: (1) widows, (2) guardians of
widows suffering under disabilities, and (3) any persons having a
beneficial interest in the estate of a widow who dies before the time
for election expires.'
Originally the right of election of dower was personal to the widow
and could not be exercised by anyone else in the event of her death, 2
though the election could be made by a court of general equity jurisdiction if the widow was incompetent. 3 In 1945, by amendment to
the Florida Guardianship Law,4 the guardian of a widow suffering
under disabilities, or the county judge on his own motion, was given
the right to exercise the power of election whenever it appeared to be
in her best interests. 5 This 1945 amendment, in effect, still left the
election a personal right to the widow.
'Fla. Laws 1951, c. 26948; cf. FLA. STAT. §§731.35, 745.23 (1949).
The
related problem of estoppel by the widow's election under a will is treated in
Note, 3 U. or FLA. L. REv. 214 (1950).
2
Kearly v. Crawford, 112 Fla. 43, 151 So. 293 (1935).
3
First Nat. Bank v. MacDonald, 100 Fla. 674, 130 So. 596 (1930).
4Fla. Laws 1945, c. 22750, §2.
5
FLA. STAT. §745.23 (1949). This apparently is superseded in so far as it
relates to an election of dower; see note 1 supra.

[3821
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Florida now is one of three states 6 allowing an election of dower
after the widow's death. 7 Under Florida's new law the election may
be made by any person having a beneficial interest in the estate of
the deceased widow, subject to the county judge's approval. 8 This
probably includes heirs, legatees, devisees, distributees, and creditors. 9
By using such a broad designation of those who may seek an election
under such circumstances, the new law may allow inequities between
persons claiming under the husband and those claiming under the
wife. What is to prevent creditors or distant relatives of the wife from
taking from the husband's estate property that should have been distributed to creditors or close relatives of the husband?' 0 There is no
apparent statutory check upon this contingency, and the Court is
accordingly faced with an interpretational problem.
The statute gives no indication whether persons seeking the election
will stand in the shoes of the widow and receive the property directly
from the husband's estate, or whether the property will be distributed
through the medium of the wife's estate and thereby be subjected to
possible additional taxes and administrative expenses.
MARITAL TORT LIABILITY
The Florida Legislature has abrogated the common law rule
whereby a husband is liable for the torts of his wife." By this enact6
Tennessee and Alabama have statutes allowing an election by the personal
representative of a deceased widow if made within the statutory period of

election. Both states require approval of the probate court after petition is

filed. The right to elect is accordingly much narrower than that now found
in Florida; see ALA. CoDE tit. 61, §2 (1940); Tr4N. CoD ANx.§8364 (Williams
1934).
7
FA. STAT. §731.35(2) (1949), as amended, Fla. Laws 1951, c. 26048.
8The statute provides: ".

.

. such election will be granted or rejected by the

county judge as the best interest of the parties entitled to participate in the
state [sic] of the deceased widow may require."
9

FLA.

STAT.

§731.03(9)

(1949)

defines "interested persons" and persons

"interested in the estate." The language of the new amendment to FLA. STAT.
§731.35(2) (1949) appears to be broad enough to allow a restricted interpretation. The term "beneficial interest" may be held limited to those who would
take on intestacy. By the same test, the term "entitled to participate" could
be similarly construed.
'oWidow's statutory share is free from liability for all debts of her husband
and all administrative costs, FLA. STAT. §781.34 (1949).
"1Fla. Laws 1951, c. 26829.
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ment Florida joins the ranks of virtually all the other states, there
being only seven 12 that have not abrogated the rule either by judicial
interpretation of the married women's property acts or by express
legislative enactment.
The policy consideration inducing legislation of this nature is based
on the married women's acts, which give the wife the right to control
her own property, to contract, and to sue and be sued as if she were a
feme sole. When the husband no longer has the common law right to
control his wife's property, it follows that he should not be held
3
responsible for her actions.'
QUALIFICATION OF JURORS
The Legislature in 1941 provided that any person convicted of
certain specified felonies' 4 "or any felony" should be disqualified from
jury service unless restored to civil rights.'s The Florida Supreme
Court construed this statute to mean that the word "felony" is limited
to a felony committed in Florida, and that a person convicted of a
felony in a federal court or in the courts of a sister state is not thereby
disqualified unless convicted of one of those felonies specifically
enumerated in the statute.' 6 The 1949 Legislature amended the act,
apparently in an effort to broaden its scope and thereby obviate one
ambiguity in the former statute. 1 7 Even after this amendment, however, doubt remained as to whether it had accomplished its purpose.
By a 1951 amendment the Legislature has now unequivocally stated
the legislative intent. No person convicted in Florida or in any other
state, territory, or country, or in any federal court, of bribery, forgery,
perjury, larceny, or any other offense that either is a felony in Florida
or if committed in Florida would be a felony, shall be qualified to
12Connecticut, Idaho, Mississippi, Nevada, Tennessee, Wisconsin, Wyoming.
13
For a coverage of Florida law prior to this enactment see Note, Liability of
Husband for Torts of His Wife, 3 U. oF FLA. L. R.Ev. 206 (1950).
14Bribery, forgery, perjury, or larceny.
' 5FLA. STAT. §40.01(2) (1941).
6
'tDuggar
v. State, 43 So.2d 860 (Fla. 1949). This case was strongly
criticized in 3 U. OF FLA. L. RExv. 255 (1950); the logical fallacy of confining
"felony" to one committed in Florida while holding that Florida "perjury" can
be committed outside Florida was also noted.
7
1 FLA. STAT. §40.01(2) (1949)
(merely adds the word "other" before
"felony").
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serve as a juror unless restored to civil rights. 18 The 1951 amendment
is more in harmony with the common law theory that a juror's qualification can be challenged because of conviction of an offense indicating
lack of integrity.19 The law as presently written safeguards our jury
system by assuring that the jury shall be composed of persons whose
character and integrity have not been tainted by prior conviction of
a felony, regardless of where convicted.
SERVICE OF PROCESS ON NONRESIDENTS
Section 47.16 of Florida Statutes 1949 has been amended in its
entirety. 20 Whereas the old provisions were limited to service of
process on an agent of a firm or copartnership composed entirely of
nonresident partners, the new enactment provides for service upon
the Secretary of State as resident agent of such partnership. The new
section encompasses any form of nonresident business organization
that may legally conduct a business in this state, and also applies to
persons who subsequently become nonresidents or conceal their
whereabouts.
2
As concerns other statutes involving service upon a partnership, '
the plaintiff now must be able to prove to the satisfaction of the court
that the partners are nonresidents or are residents who have concealed
their whereabouts. 22 When service is sought upon a nonresident
corporation the plaintiff will probably be under a like obligation to
23
show that none of the officers or agents enumerated in the statute
are present within the state.
When there is no member or agent upon whom to serve process,
consent of the business to the exercise of jurisdiction by the state
courts has been a troublesome problem. Some authorities hold that
consent must be actual; 24 others admit implied consent as well.25 Our
18

FLY.,STAT. §40.01(2) (1949), as amended, Fla. Laws 1951, c. 26848.
193 U. oF FA. L. REv. 255 (1950).
2Fla. Laws 1951, c. 26657.
21
FLA. STAT. §47.15 (1949) (pertains to service upon members of a part-

nership who are present within the state).
22Cf. Rorick v. Stilwell, 101 Fla. 4, 133 So. 609 (1931); State ex rel. Palmer
v. Gray, 92 Fla. 1123, 111 So. 242 (1927).
23FLA. STAT. §47.17 (1949).
24
See GOODRiCH, CoNmrrL
oF LAws §73 (2d ed. 1938).
25
E.g., Lafayette Ins. Co. v. Fre* h. 18 How. 404 (U.S. 1855).
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new enactment relies on implied consent arising by acceptance of the
privilege to engage in business in this state. In dealing with similar
statutes the United States Supreme Court has denied jurisdiction unless actual notice is given to the foreign defendant that a cause is
pending against it.26 The new statute meets this contingency by
requiring service to be made upon nonresidents in accordance with
Section 43.30 of Florida Statutes 1949, which provides that the Secretary of State shall give actual notice to the business.
When the cause of action resulting from a business transaction 27
arises outside the state in which service is being attempted, jurisdiction under such a statute is denied. 2 8 An examination of the wording
of our statute indicates a similar limitation.
Since the new enactment provides that service pursuant to its terms
shall have the force and legal validity of personal service, the question
of constitutionality is raised. As regards corporate entities the prevailing view upholds statutes of this nature,2 but as applied to noncorporate entities such statutes are generally held unconstitutional.3 0
Therefore, unless the courts can be persuaded to follow the modem
trend, which upholds service of this type on noncorporate entities as a
proper regulation under the police power, 31 a portion of our new
statute may be held invalid.
JUVENILE COURT ACT
The long-needed Juvenile Court Act became effective October 1,
1951.32 But for a few important changes, the Legislature adopted
2601d Wayne Mut. Life Ass'n v. McDonough, 204 U.S. 8 (1907).
27
Mere isolated acts of solicitation or mail-order solicitations are by them-

selves still insufficient to constitute "conducting business" within the state; see
4 U. OF FLA. L. REv. 98 (1951).
28

Simon v. Southern Ry., 236 U.S. 115 (1915).
Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950); Kraus v. American
Tobacco Co., 283 Pa. 146, 129 AUt. 60 (1925); Frazier v. Steel & Tube Co.,
101 W. Va. 327, 132 S.E. 723 (1926).
30
Flexner v. Farson, 248 U.S. 289 (1919); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714
(1877); Cabanne v. Graf, 87 Minn. 510, 92 N.W. 461 (1902); Knox Bros. v.
E. W. Wagner & Co., 141 Tenn. 348, 209 S.W. 638 (1918).
31
Riley v. Sweat, 110 Fla. 362, 149 So. 48 (1933); Davidson v. H. L.
Doherty & Co., 214 Iowa 739, 241 N.W. 700 (1932).
32
For a full discussion see Waybright, A Proposed Juvenile Court Act for
29

Florida, 4 U. oF FLA. L. RE.v. 16 (1951).
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the proposed act drawn up jointly by fourteen state-wide organizations under the able leadership of Roger J. Waybright.33 Three
deviations from the proposed act should be noted:
1. The maximum jurisdictional age limit of the juvenile court was
lowered from the recommended 18 years3 4 to 17.35
2. The proposed ban on publication of the name and picture of
the child36 was not enacted into the statute.
3. The financing plan was made permissive07 rather than mandatory. 38
The act itself is not permissive, in that it applies to every separate
juvenile court heretofore or hereafter created, and to all county judge's
courts acting as juvenile courts in counties having no separate juvenile court.3 9 In effect it creates a uniform system of juvenile courts
throughout the state.
As to the effect of the new act upon the existing separate juvenile
courts created by special acts, all provisions of such special acts
applying to these courts are repealed except those that (1) create and
establish a separate juvenile court, (2) fix the date upon which the
term of office of the judge shall commence and terminate, (3) require
the personnel of such a court to devote their full time to their duties
therein, (4) provide for referees on disposition of articles of evidence
33

Fla. Laws 1951, c. 26880. The act will become

Fr.A. STAT.

§§89.01-89.20

(1951).

U4Waybright, supra note 32, at 28.
Fla. Laws 1951, c. 26880, §1, FLA. STAT. §39.01(6) (1951). The juvenile
court may retain jurisdiction once acquired, however, until the child reaches 21
years of age, FLA. STAT. §39.02(5) (1951).
3SWaybright, supra note 32, at 84. The act does retain other protective
35

features: (1) prohibiting fingerprinting or photographing except by special order

of the judge, (2) providing that records shall not be public, (3) closing hearings
except to specified parties, (4) using only child's initials and case number on
appeal and in other public reports; see Fla. Laws 1951, c. 26880, §1, FLA. STAT.
§989.03(6), 39.09(2), 89.14(9) (1951).
37
Fa. Laws 1951, c.26880, §1, FLA. STAT. §39.18 (1951). The new act
gives the board of county commissioners in each county the power to levy
taxes in order to raise the necessary funds, Fla. Laws 1951, c.26880, §1, FLA.
STAT. §39.18(9) (1951).
3SWaybright, supra note 32, at 38.
39

Fla. Laws 1951, c. 26880, §1, FLA.
Gir. FLA. 051-280 (July 20, 1951).

STAT.

§89.01(1) (1951); see Op. AT'y
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or collection of costs from parents, (5) fix the salary of the judge,
counselor, or other personnel, (6) relate to amounts to be appro40
priated for the expense of operation of a separate juvenile court,
and (7) confer additional jurisdiction on a separate juvenile court,
41
provided they are in effect on the effective date of the instant statute.
HOMESTEAD REALTY TAX EXEMPTION
Section 192.12 of Florida Statutes 1949, as amended by Florida
Laws 1951, Chapter 26899, attempts to place restrictions on the
right to claim the annual exemption from Florida taxation of $5,000
of the assessed valuation of homestead realty. Heretofore the claimant did not have to be a Florida resident for any set prior period,
and perhaps he did not have to be a Florida resident at all provided
his property was the pennanent home of those "legally or naturally"
dependent on him. 42 Now by enactment the Legislature requires
the claimant to be a legal resident of the state for one year prior
to his making application for this exemption.
The former statute was identical with the substantive portion of
Article X, Section 7, of the Florida Constitution, which provides
further that "The Legislature may prescribe appropriate and reasonable laws regulating the manner of establishing the right to said
exemption.- The latest enactment must stand on this provision or
must fall as unconstitutional.
Section 2 of the new enactment makes the year's residence a
condition precedent to exemption. Doubtless the Legislature may,
as it has done in the past, require all applications to be filed prior
to a certain date.43 It is doubtful, however, that this enactment
falls within the scope of Article X, Section 7. Time for filing is
one thing; qualifications for claiming the right are another. By
this new requirement the Legislature purports to remove, without
4

OFla. Laws 1951, c. 26880, §1, FLA.

STAT.

§§39.18(7), 39.18(10) (1951);

see Ops. Arr'y G~m. FLA. 051-181 (June 22, 1951), 051-167 (June 19, 1951),
051-231 (July 20, 1951).
41Fla. Laws 1951, c. 26880, §3, referring to FLA. STAT. §39.02(7) (1951).
42
FLA. CONST. Art. X, §7; for a detailed analysis see Crosby and Miller, Our

Legal Chameleon, The Florida Homestead Exemption: V, 2 U. OF FLA. L. REv.
346, 863-365 (1949).
43FL. STAT. §192.16 (1949).
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the aid of a constitutional amendment, a right previously recognized
under the Constitution. Therefore, the statute as amended may
well be unconstitutional.
LARCENY REDEFINED
The crimes of larceny, embezzlement, and obtaining property by
false pretenses have been combined into one crime designated as
larceny. 44

It is significant to note that all the requisites of these

crimes have been retained by this incorporation.45 The Legislature
has, however, made establishment of intent alternative; it can consist
either of depriving the owner of the use of his property or of appropriating it to the use of the taker or another. 46
Section 3, Chapter 26912, of Florida Laws 1951, relating to the
drawing of the indictment, information, or warrant, is the most
revolutionary feature of the new statute, for it resolves a dilemma
long present in Florida criminal procedure.47 The prosecutor now
may charge, allege, and describe the acts of the defendant in general terms,48 thereby permitting a conviction if the requisite elements of any one of the incorporated crimes are proved. Previously
the prosecutor had to elect the crime to be charged. It was often a
difficult task to determine whether a particular factual situation
constituted larceny, embezzlement, or obtaining property by false
pretenses because of the many technical differences between these
crimes and their inconsistent treatment by the courts. It was not
unusual for a guilty person to go free because he was charged with
one offense and the proof adduced was held, as a matter of law, to
be proof of another.
Section 2 provides that a person charged with obtaining property
by false pretenses can no longer use as part of his defense a con44

Fa. Laws 1951, c. 26912.

45Id. at §1.
461n the past the Florida Court has considered lucre causa an element of
larceny but has had no difficulty in finding it to be present, Masters v. State,
159 Fla. 617, 32 So.2d 276 (1947); Cordell v. State, 157 Fla. 295, 25 So.2d
885 (1946).
47
See MUM, CRnmiAL LAw §114(b) (1934).
4
SThe court still may require the state to furnish the defendant with a bill
of particulars in proper cases when sufficient cause exists.
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tention that the owner was motivated by an illegal, immoral, or
unworthy purpose at the time he parted with his property. This
has never been a legal defense, 49 but it has been effectively used
at times to convince the jury that the prosecuting witness is in no
position to complain of the loss of his property.
Sections 4 and 5 set forth the two degrees of the crime as grand
and petit, and retain the determinate value of fifty dollars as found
in Section 811.01 of Florida Statutes 1949. Section 6 specifically
exempts certain statutes from being altered, modified, or repealed
by this legislation. "°
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
The 1951 Legislature has made numerous changes in the Workmen's Compensation Law, 51 but of particular importance is Section
440.39, Florida Statutes 1949, as amended by Florida Laws 1951,
Chapter 26546. Formerly, the injured employee had to elect whether
to accept compensation for his injury or to proceed directly against
the third party tortfeasor. If the injured employee chose to accept
compensation he was precluded from bringing an action against the
tortfeasor;5 2 and the employer or insurance carrier 53 was given one
492 Bisnop, CarMINAL LAw §781 (9th ed. 1923).
50

FLA. STAT. §§706.19, 811.03-811.05, 811.07, 811.08, 811.11, 811.13-811.15,
811.19-811.21, 812.10, 812.12, 821.10, 821.22, 821.23 (1949).
51
Increases maximum weekly compensation payable from $22 to $35, FLA.
STAT. §440.12 (1949), as amended, Fla. Laws 1951, c. 26876, §1(2).
Extends maximum duration of payments in case of permanent total disability
from 350 to 700 weeks, FLA. STAT. §440.15 (1949), as amended, Fla. Laws
1951, c. 26877, §1(1), repealing FLA. STAT. §440.20(13) (1949).
Gives the Commission authority to determine the order of preference of the
respective parties when the injured employee is survived by a widow or widower
and also a child or children either of the union existing at the time of the injury
or of some former marriage, FLA. STAT. §440.16(2) (1949), as amended, Fla.
Laws 1951, c.26966, §1(2)(c).
Allows notice of filing claim to be sent by regular mail rather than registered
mail to such persons, other than claimant, as the Commission considers interested
parties, FLA. STAT. §440.25(2) (1949), as amended, Fla. Laws 1951, c.26967,
§1(2).
52

See Legis., 1 U. OF FLA. L. REv. 278 (1948).

53

Hereafter, in this discussion, the word "employer" is used to mean "employer"
or "insurance carrier," as the case may be.
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year within which to sue. If at the end of one year the employer
had not proceeded against the tortfeasor, the injured employee was
then given the right to do so on the basis of the personal injuries
54
sustained.
Under the amended statute the employee no longer has to make
an election between these two avenues of redress but may accept
compensation payments and at the same time proceed directly
against the third party torffeasor.5 5 This action may be instituted
by the employee individually or in the name of the employee and
for the use and benefit of the employer.56 Should the employee
fail to bring an action against the tortfeasor within one year from
the accrual of the cause of action, the employer, if he has made
payments under the act, may then proceed.57
The amended act allows the employer to file notice58 in the action
brought by the injured employee, setting out the amount of medical
benefits and the amount of compensation claimed or paid. This
notice constitutes a lien on the judgment to the extent of the judicially
determined pro rata share thereof for compensation paid. This share
is based on such equitable distribution of the amount recovered
as the court may determine; and from it is deducted a pro rata
share of the employee's court costs and reasonable attorney's fees. 9
It should be noted, however, that if the employee or his dependent
accepts compensation benefits, the employer becomes subrogated to
the rights of the employee against the torifeasor and will share in
a recovery to the extent of his pro rata share as determined by the
court. Accordingly, failure of the employer to file notice does not
60
deprive him of his right as a subrogee to share in the judgment.
Giving notice is advisable, however; it affords a lien on the judgment, while without it the right of subrogation alone remains.
54

Legis., supra note 52, at 282.
FLA. STAT. §440.89 (1949), as amended, F]a; Laws 1951, c. 26546, §1(1).
56
Fa. Laws 1951, c. 26546, §1(3).
571d. at §1(4).
581d. at §1(8). The use of the word "may" seems more directory than mandatory and therefore creates some uncertainty. Whether the employer can later
acquire a lien, after failing to file this notice before rendition of judgment, is
doubtffl. Probably his only recourse is the second remedy prescribed in the
statute, namely, that of a subrogee.
59
Fla. Laws 1951, c. 26546, §1(3).
cold. at §1(2).
55
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Under the amended act an employee receiving payment from
his employer may on occasion be awarded a share of the judgment
in such amount that the remainder which the employer receives is
less than the compensation payments already made by the employer. 61 The practical effect is that today the court can award an
injured employee more recompense, at the expense of his employer,
than the jury actually found him entitled to on the basis of the tortfeasor's negligence.
ABATEMENT OF ACTIONS
Formerly under a judicial interpretation of the poorly drafted
Florida Survival Statute, all actions for personal injury survived the
death of the injured party except assault and battery, slander, false
imprisonment, and malicious prosecution. 62 An amendment to the
Survival Statute provides that "No action for personal injuries and no
other action shall die with the person.. ." and that such actions may
be prosecuted and defended by the personal representative of the
deceased. 63 The amendment, while allowing all claims for personal
injuries to survive the decedents death, does not broaden the scope
64
of recovery beyond claims for purely compensatory damages.
It should be noted that an action under the Survival Statute and
one under the Death by Wrongful Act Statute are two entirely different things.6 5 An action under the Survival Statute always accrues
to the personal representative of the deceased, whereas the action for
death by wrongful act accrues to the personal representative only if
there is no widow, minor child, or other person surviving who is
entitled to support from deceased. 6 6 The only time an action under
the Survival Statute can be joined with an action under the Death
61

Under the old act, if the employee elected compensation and the employer

secured a judgment, the employee received only that portion of the judgment
remaining after deduction of court costs, reasonable attorney's fees, and com-

pensation benefits payable or paid, FLA. STAT. §440.39(4) (1949).
62
Waller v. First Say. & Trust Co., 103 Fla. 1025, 138 So. 780 (1931); see
Note, 1 U. oF FLA. L. 1Ev. 260 (1948).
63
FLA. STAT. §45.11 (1949), as amended, Fla. Laws 1951, c. 26541.
64

Ake v. Birnbaum, 156 Fla. 735, 25 So.2d 213 (1946).

65

See Note, I U. oF FLA. L. REV. 260 (1948).

66

FLA. STAT.

§768.02 (1949).
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Statute is when the personal representative prosecutes both actions in
his capacity as personal representative."
RECOVERY OF GAMBLING LOSSES
By recent enactment, the Florida Legislature has made gambling
losses recoverable. 68 The loser of money or any other thing of value
may sue within 90 days after the loss and payment or delivery. He
may recover for his own use and benefit an amount equal to the
money lost and the thing of value lost or its value, at his option, plus
a reasonable attorney's fee. If he has a legal guardian or curator,
that person may exercise the same rights.6 9
If at the end of this period, the loser has not begun and effectively
prosecuted the suit, an additional 90-day period is allowed within
which suit may be brought (a) by the wife or husband of the loser;
or (b) if the loser have a wife or husband and/or minor child, by any
relative of the loser or of the loser's wife or husband; or (c) if the
loser be an unmarried minor, by his or her parents. Recovery under
(a) and (b) above shall be for the use and benefit of the loser's
spouse or children. Recovery under (c) shall be for the use and
benefit of the loser's parents.70
Recovery may be had from the winner, or any person promoting
or directing the gambling transaction, or any person in charge of the
place where the gambling occurs. These persons are jointly and
severally liable, and the liability extends to their assignees and transferees with notice, and to their personal representatives. 71 The plaintiff can use writs of attachment and garnishment to recover the money
lost to the same extent as if the action were based on a contract, and
is entitled to a writ of replevin to recover a thing of value to the
72
extent provided by the replevin statutes.
The statute grants to the loser immunity from prosecution for illegal
gambling no matter who brings the action. In any case he must
6

RFLA. C.L.R. 9(g): "A pleader may set up in the same action as many
claims or causes of action ... in the same right as he has . .
68TFa. Laws 1951, c. 26543.

691d. at §2.
701d. at §3.
71id. at §4.
721d. at Av
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produce evidence, attend and testify, and cannot claim the privilege.
73
against self incrimination, since he is granted statutory immunity.
Whenever a suit is brought under this enactment, recovery is
allowed of an additional amount equal to the amount lost and paid,
which is to be for the use and benefit of the State of Florida. 74 The
statute charges the state attorney with the duty to protect the interests
of the state 75 and to collect and deliver to the state treasurer that
portion of the judgment to which the state is entitled.7 6
This act does not extend to pari-mutuels or any gambling transaction
77
expressly authorized by law.
Formerly gambling transactions, other than pari-mutuel and some
few expressly authorized, were unlawful, 78 but no provision was made
for the recovery of losses. This act should greatly retard unauthorized
gambling throughout the state, since it allows recovery of the loss by
the loser and recovery of an equal amount in the nature of punitive
damages for the use and benefit of the State of Florida.
DOUGLAS M.

CAILTON

EVANS CRARY, JR.

73Id.
741d.
75Id.
76Id.
771d.
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§§2, 3.
§7.
§8.
§1.

FLA. STAT.

§§849, 850, 851, 615.11, 548.01, 548.03, 817.28.
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